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March, 2001The family investment hypothesis predicts that credit-constrained immigrant families adopt
a household strategy for financing post-migration human capital investment in which the partner
with labor market comparative advantage engages in investment activities and the other partner
undertakes labor market activities which finance current consumption.  We assess this hypothesis
by focusing on two issues: first, the extent to which the specialization in the investing versus
financing role is based on comparative advantage versus gender, and second, the extent to which
credit constraints offer a potential explanation for observed behavior. Using a unique new Australian
data set we find that comparative advantage and gender can be separately identified in migrating
families. We find some support for the family investment hypothesis among traditional families
(where labor market comparative advantage resides with the male partner) but not among
nontraditional families. (JEL D10, J22, J61)1
1Researchers often do not know which individuals were married at the time of migration let
alone whether they were married to their current spouse. Because this is likely to be a smaller
problem for recent rather than established immigrants, there exists the possibility that household
formation plays a role in generating observed earnings-age profiles.
Previous researchers have hypothesized that credit-constrained immigrant families wishing
to make post-migration human capital investments must finance that investment themselves (Long,
1980; Beach and Worswick, 1993; Duleep and Sanders 1993; Worswick, 1996; Baker and Benjamin,
1997).  This results in specialization among immigrant family members with one partner investing
in host country-specific human capital and the other partner undertaking those labor market activities
that facilitate the financing of current consumption.  Specifically, secondary workers in immigrant
families are expected to be more likely to work, to work longer hours, and to forego their own
investment in human capital by initially taking better paying, but dead-end, jobs. 
Researchers attempting to evaluate the family investment hypothesis have struggled with
important data limitations.  First, decisions about which partner will invest and which partner will
finance are in principle based on each person’s comparative advantage yet it is typically not possible
to identify comparative advantage separately from gender.  Second, while family units at the time
of data collection are identified, family units at the time of migration are completely unknown rasing
the possibility that the observed assimilation profiles are the result of selectivity into marriage rather
than immigrant settlement.
1 
The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) is a new data set which allows
us to investigate and overcome these limitations. It contains detailed data for a recent cohort of
migrating households including principal applicant status and detailed visa category. A substantial2
2 Once an principal applicant applies for and is granted a visa, dependent family members
are automatically granted visas as well. 
3 In 1994, 15.4 percent of new immigrants to the United States were skill-based while 31.5
percent entered as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and an additional 26.5 percent entered
through the numerically-limited family categories.  In 1995 in Canada, 50.5 percent of new entrants
were skill-based and 38.0 percent were family-based.  In Australia 32.2 percent of immigrants were
admitted in 1994-1995 on the basis of labor market skills, while 33.3 percent were admitted on the
basis of family relationships (Cobb-Clark, et al, 2001: Table 1.)
portion of immigrants to Australia are admitted on the basis of a “points test” in which points are
awarded for labor market skills.  So long as couples in this skilled migrant category designate the
individual most likely to satisfy the test as their principal applicant,
2 data on principal applicant
status allows us to separately identify both labor market comparative advantage and gender. Given
suitably detailed data, this empirical strategy is feasible in countries, such as Australia and Canada,
where skill- based migrants comprise a significant fraction of the immigrant inflow. It is not feasible
with data from countries ( notably the United States) where skill-based immigrants represent a small
fraction of total immigration.
3   Our goals in this paper are to examine the distribution of comparative
advantage within couples who migrate to Australia together, and then to re-examine the family
investment hypothesis by focusing on comparative advantage rather than gender, and by limiting our
analysis to immigrant couples who migrated together. 
Our results indicate that more than 16 percent of skill-based couple-households migrating
to Australia are “nontraditional” in the sense that it is the female partner who is the principal3
applicant.  The probability that the female partner is the principal applicant has a strong positive
correlation with her education and work experience, and a negative correlation with the male
partner’s work experience and education. Thus, principal applicant status  does appear to be related
to those characteristics determining comparative advantage in the labor market.  Perhaps
surprisingly, the fraction of nontraditional families does not appear to vary substantially across
region of origin. This is helpful for tests of the family investment hypothesis because it means that,
conditional on gender, variation in comparative advantage is not collinear with region of origin (and
hence possibly culture). 
With this information in hand we implement tests of the family investment hypothesis that
follow Baker and Benjamin (1997) in comparing the secondary worker in an immigrant couple to
immigrant secondary workers married to non-immigrant spouses.  Following that, we carefully
consider the role of gender and comparative advantage in our sample of immigrant families.  While
we find some support for the family investment hypothesis among traditional households,
nontraditional households appear to behave quite differently.
In the following section of the paper, the existing literature on the family investment
hypothesis is reviewed. Section 2 presents an overview of the LSIA data and a exploration of the
relationship between gender, principal applicant status and labor market comparative advantage in
that data. Our tests of the family investment hypothesis follow in Section 3. The final section of the
paper discusses some general conclusions and provides suggestions for future research.
I. The Family Investment Hypothesis4
4A more limited number of studies have focused on participation or unemployment. 
5See Borjas (1985) and LaLonde and Topel (1992) for a discussion of the methodological
issues involved in estimating the magnitude of the assimilation effect.
Early immigration research focused on the relationship between relative immigrant-native
earnings on the one hand and year of arrival (cohort effects) and the number of years since migration
(typically called assimilation) on the other.
4  Male immigrants were found to have lower earnings
immediately after arrival, but  relatively high earnings growth  over time.
5 These patterns were
thought to be explained by the difficulties in completely transferring human capital across countries
and the resulting need to accumulate host country-specific human capital (Chiswick, 1978).  Long
(1980) was the first to demonstrate that although immigrant women often have higher earnings than
native-born women immediately after migration, relative immigrant-native earnings declined as the
number of years since migration increased. The contrast between the patterns for women and those
for men lead Long to speculate that immigrant wives were working to finance their husbands'
investment in U.S.-specific human capital. 
Researchers attempting to empirically evaluate the family investment model have generally
adopted one of three approaches.  The first approach has been to compare the employment behavior
and earnings of immigrants who are assumed to be credit constrained with the native born who are
not (Long, 1980; Beach and Worswick, 1993; Worswick 1996; 1999).  The difficulty with this,
however, is that one cannot separate the effects of credit constraints from other the dimensions of
the immigrant experience--for example, a lack of skill transferability (Chiswick, 1978), cultural
differences in the preferences for work (Reimers, 1985; Antecol, 1999), or the selectivity associated
with endogenous migration decisions (Borjas, 1987)--which lead the behavior of immigrants and5
6 Duleep and Sanders (1993) focus on potential country-of-origin differences in the need for
post-migration human capital investment, while MacPherson and Stewart (1989) incorporate
information about husbands’ post-migration human capital investments directly into a model of
immigrant wives’ labor force participation decision.
7These early empirical tests of the family investment hypothesis have produced somewhat
mixed results.  While some researchers find evidence in support of the hypothesis (Duleep and
Sanders, 1993), others find only limited (MacPherson and Stewart, 1989) or ambiguous support
(Worswick, 1996) for the notion that labor market outcomes in immigrant families can be explained
by a family investment strategy.
8Baker and Benjamin (1997) refer to this as variation in “family type”.
9Using cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data leads to well-known methodological
problems in identifying earnings assimilation (Borjas, 1985; LaLonde and Topel, 1992). 
natives to differ.  A second approach has been to compare the labor market outcomes of those
immigrant families believed to require human capital investments with immigrant families who do
not (MacPherson and Stewart, 1989; Duleep and Sanders, 1993).
6  Without corresponding data on
the variation in the credit constraints faced by immigrant families, however, this approach does not
provide a means of assessing the role of credit constraints per se and again the effects of credit
constraints may be confounded by regional/cultural variation in preferences for work.
7 
Finally, Baker and Benjamin (1997) use variation in family nativity (i.e., native, immigrant
and mixed families) to assess both the need to invest and the presence of credit constraints.
8  In
addition, their analysis extends previous analyses of the family investment hypothesis in two other
important ways:  first, by using pseudo-panel techniques to identify wage and hours assimilation
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and second, by explicitly considering alternative explanations for the observed wage and hours
profiles.   They find that employment assimilation among immigrants to Canada cannot be solely
explained by underlying wage assimilation because estimated hours/wage elasticities are too small.
Variation in  outcomes across immigrant families (who are assumed to be credit constrained) and
mixed families (who are not) is, however, consistent with the predictions of the family investment
hypothesis leading the authors to conclude that “the family investment model has more empirical
support than previously thought.”         
As Baker and Benjamin note, however, cultural differences in the preference for work
between immigrants married to immigrants (in immigrant families) and immigrants married to
natives (in mixed families)  are also potential explanations for the patterns of hours and wage
assimilation that they observe.  In particular, if having a native-born spouse promotes the adoption
of native preferences (or if there is selectivity into intermarriage) then there may be systematic
differences in the behavior of mixed and immigrant families which are unrelated to the presence of
credit constraints.  Their data soundly reject the hypothesis that own assimilation profiles are the
same for immigrant husbands and immigrant wives in mixed families, however.  Thus, Baker and
Benjamin are able to rule out gender-constant variation in preferences across immigrant and mixed
families concluding instead that “the heterogeneity in the sample has both a family and gender
component.”  This conclusion is consistent with the inter-ethnic variation in the gender wage gap
observed among immigrants to the United States (Antecol, 1999) which provides additional evidence
that cultural differences in gender roles within the family may in fact be quite important.
Unfortunately, however, Baker and Benjamin’s data do not exhibit sufficient variability to allow
them to also rule out this type of more complex preference-based explanation of their results.  7
10Note Baker and Benjamin find that the sum of the estimated cohort effects for immigrant
husbands and wives are negative for the most recent cohort of immigrants (see Baker and Benjamin,
1997:Table 2). Similarly, Worswick (1996) finds that immigrant women do not supply more hours
than native-born women in the first few years after migration.
Despite the fact that the data available to previous researchers has not allowed them to
disentangle gender and comparative advantage, there are nevertheless some hints in the results of
previous research that the family investment hypothesis cannot be a complete explanation of
immigrant household behaviour and assimilation patterns. For example, if the labor supply and
human capital investment behavior of immigrant families is driven by credit constraints, we should
observe very recent immigrant families acting consistently with the family investment hypothesis.
Credit constraints are almost certainly more binding immediately after migration (Worswick, 1999).
Yet there is evidence that while the family investment hypothesis holds for more established
immigrants, it does not describe the behavior of very recent immigrants (Worswick, 1996; Baker and
Benjamin, 1997).
10
Our objective is build upon Baker and Benjamin’s analysis by distinguishing between the
family investment hypothesis and variation in preferences as potential explanations of immigrant
behavior.  One strategy for doing this would be to directly control for those factors--in particular,
ethnic origin or  age at migration--which might underlay the heterogeneity in preferences about
gender roles within the family (Baker and Benjamin, 1997).   We adopt an alternative  approach,
however.  In particular, we use detailed information about the  immigration process itself to
separately identify both comparative advantage and gender.  This additional dimension of variability
in our data provides us with a direct test of the relative importance of the family investment8
11 Throughout the analysis our estimation samples are restricted to couples in which both
partners were separately interviewed (more than 95 percent of eligible cases) and between the ages
of 19 and 60.
12See Beach and Worswick (1993) for a discussion of the importance of linked husband/wife
panel data in directly testing the family investment hypothesis.
hypothesis--which is based on comparative advantage--as opposed to gender-based heterogeneity
in preferences as explanations of immigrant behavior.   In addition, like Baker and Benjamin  (1997)
we also exploit variation in family types to assess whether immigrant behavior is consistent with the
presence of credit constraints.  
II. Gender and Comparative Advantage in the LSIA
The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) offers us a unique opportunity
to re-examine the role of the family in immigrants' early labor market experiences. The LSIA
collected a considerable amount of demographic, human capital, and labor market information for
a cohort of principal applicants and their spouses.  Spanning the first three and a half years of the
settlement process, the three waves of data present the opportunity to follow a cohort of recent
immigrants to Australia as they enter the labor market and begin looking for work.
11  As the LSIA
data provide no information about native families and only limited information about native-born
partners in mixed families it will not be possible to make statements about how immigrant status in
and of itself matters.  Still, our data for mixed and immigrant households provide a direct test of the
family investment hypothesis.
12 
The LSIA sample generalizes to principal applicants aged 15 and older who arrived in9
13 Not surprisingly, our data suggest that household formation and dissolution are important
demographic phenomena within the immigrant population.  Three and a half years after migration,
more than 20 percent of principal applicants living with spouses who were not part of the migrating
unit had formed new these relationships since migration.  Approximately two percent of couples
migrating together had split up over the first three years of the settlement process.
Australia between September 1993 and August 1995. Along with interviewing principal applicants,
complete information was also collected for migrating-unit spouses and limited information was
collected for other members of the household.  See Williams, et al. (1997) and Cobb-Clark, et al.
(2001) for more details.
Unlike earlier studies of the family investment hypothesis, our “immigrant” sample is
restricted to couples in which the principal applicant and his or her partner is also an immigrant
migrating at the same time. This reduces the extent to which our results may be confounded by
assortative mating after immigration.
13
Although conceptually comparative advantage is not synonymous with gender, previous
researchers have not had specific information about comparative advantage and have instead proxied
comparative advantage with gender in the belief that men are more likely to have the comparative
advantage in the labor market while women are more likely to be secondary workers (Long, 1980;
MacPherson and Stewart, 1989; Duleep and Sanders, 1993; Beach and Worswick, 1993; Worswick
1996; 1999; Baker and Benjamin, 1997).  Apart from the fact that gender is only an imperfect proxy
for comparative advantage, this assumption makes it impossible to disentangle explanations for
immigrant behavior which are based on comparative advantage (i.e., the family investment10
14Specifically, we selected Concessional Family, Independent, and Employer Nomination
Scheme (ENS) immigrants. The Concessional Family program selects immigrants on the basis of
both family connections and labor market skills, while Independent migrants are those without
family relationships who are admitted solely on the basis of skills.   ENS migrants are admitted as
the result of  pre-arranged offers of employment from Australian employers.   Others who were
selected as a result of humanitarian concerns, close family relationships, or for their intention to
establish a business in Australia have been dropped from the sample.  Information about visa status
comes from Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs administrative records not
self-reports.
15The principal applicants in migrating units in both Concessional Family and Independent
immigrant classes are subject to a points test.  Although the exact test differs in the two programs,
applicants are awarded points on the basis of age, educational qualifications, English language
ability, occupation, and previous work experience.
hypothesis) from those based on gender (i.e., heterogeneity in preferences).  LSIA data, however,
separately identify principal applicants and their spouses allowing us to identify comparative
advantage by determining which member of the couple met the selection criteria and was granted
the visa. 
   Within each couple we might reasonably expect the principal applicant to have the
comparative labor market advantage for three reasons: first, our sample consists of only of
immigrants selected on the basis of their labor market skills
14, second, the points test used to select
skilled immigrants closely corresponds to our notion of comparative advantage
15, and third, it is
reasonable to assume that couples maximize the probability of successfully obtaining a visa by11
designating the partner with the strongest case as the principal applicant. 
We begin by investigating the relationship between principal applicant status, gender, and
productivity-related characteristics.  The first row of Table 1 demonstrates that the principal
applicant in couples gaining admission to Australia in the skill-based category is not always male;
more than 16 percent of the time the principal applicant is the female partner.  Furthermore, the data
do seem to support the proposition that principal applicant status is related to ones comparative
advantage in the labor market. The probability that the wife is the principal applicant has a strong
and statistically significant positive correlation with the wife’s education and work experience, and
a strong negative correlation with the husband’s work experience and education (particularly the
latter).  Interestingly, the presence of children in the household does not have a statistically
significant effect on the probability that the female partner is the principal applicant.
[Table 1 about here]
The final row of Table 1 summarizes the incidence of female principal applicants by region
of origin.  Perhaps surprisingly, the fraction of nontraditional families does not appear to vary
substantially across region of origin and the differences are not statistically significant. This is
helpful for tests of the family investment hypothesis because it means that, conditional on gender,
variation in comparative advantage is not collinear with region of origin (and hence possibly with
culturally based preferences for work or particular gender roles). 
In the next section we implement tests of the family investment hypothesis which use
principal applicant status rather than gender as a proxy for comparative advantage, and which can12
16In addition, the family investment hypothesis makes a number of other predictions about
job turnover, tenure, and wage growth.  Predictions about labor supply--in particular, labor market
participation or hours of work--are not clear, but rather depend on the nature of the investment.  If
human capital investment takes place primarily off the job then we would expect participation and
hours to be relatively low for principal applicants and relatively high for their spouses.  Alternatively,
if human capital investment takes place primarily on the job, then we would expect principal
therefore separately identify the effects of gender and comparative advantage on the labor market
behavior of immigrant households.  
III. Testing the Family Investment Hypothesis
In principle, household decisions about the division of labor within the household are  made
on the basis of each individual’s comparative advantage so that immigrants with the comparative
advantage in labor market activities are expected to devote more resources to human capital
investments such as formal education, job search, or job shopping immediately after migration, while
their partners are expected to take on the role of financing that investment. 
Thus, the family investment hypothesis predicts that relative to native-born couples who are
not credit constrained, principal applicants in immigrant families will have relatively high  rates of
school enrollment and spend more time searching for and shopping among jobs resulting in lower
employment and lower labor market participation. Secondary workers in immigrant families, on the
other hand, have the comparative advantage in financing their partner’s investment and are expected
to have higher labor market participation and employment rates along with a lower probability of
being enrolled in school.
1613
applicants to work relatively more, while their spouses worked relatively less.
17While Baker and Benjamin ( 1997) focused on hours assimilation  over time, our short
panel does not allow us to consider patterns of hours (or wage) assimilation.  Therefore, our focus
will be on testing the family investment hypothesis through direct measures of human capital
investment shortly after migration. 
Immigrant Spouses: The Role of Credit Constraints
In Table 2 we follow the empirical strategy of Baker and Benjamin (1997) in comparing
immigrant couples with mixed immigrant/resident couples in order to assess the importance of credit
constraints themselves.
17   Our sample of  “mixed” couples consists of immigrants migrating as
“spouses” or “fiancees” who are married to (or living as if married to) native-born Australians or to
immigrants residing in Australia for more than eight years.  Mixed couples are expected to differ
from couples that recently migrated together  in two ways: first, they are less likely to be making
human capital investments, and second, they are less likely to be credit constrained.  Given this, the
family investment hypothesis suggests that the behavior of immigrant spouses (i.e., secondary
workers) in mixed couples will differ from that of spouses (also secondary workers) in immigrant
couples even though given our sample definitions both are themselves foreign born.  Spouses in
immigrant couples are expected to be more likely to finance their immigrant partners’ post-migration
human capital investment than spouses in mixed couples and are therefore expected to be less likely
to invest in job search (either on- or off-the-job) and formal education, but have higher employment
and participation rates. Alternatively, if the behavior of foreign-born spouses is driven by
heterogeneity in preferences about the appropriate division of labor between men and women rather
than variation in credit constraints across mixed and immigrant families we would expect to see little14
difference in outcomes across mixed and immigrant families after we hold constant the gender of
the principal applicant.
The estimates reported in Table 2 are from linear probability models estimated using our
sample of spouses all of whom are immigrants.  The coefficients can be interpreted as the difference
between spouses in immigrant and mixed households (in percentage points) controlling for
observable characteristics. The observable characteristics we control for are: age and education of
the secondary worker, age of their partner,  number of children in the household, number of adults
in the household, region of origin, and state of residence in Australia. We use White’s
heteroscedasticity consistent variance-covariance estimate, and report t-statistics in square
parenthesis. 
[Table 2 about here]
Consider first traditional families (column 1).  Controlling for observable characteristics,
foreign-born women who are secondary workers married to immigrants (and hence likely to be credit
constrained) are more likely to be participating in the labor market at the first interview (about six
months after migration) than are foreign-born women who are secondary workers married to
Australian residents (and hence less likely to be credit constrained). By the third interview, some
three and a half years after migration, secondary workers in immigrant households are significantly
more likely to be participating and employed in the Australian labor market.  These results for
traditional families are consistent with the family investment model.
At the same time, we also find that foreign-born women who are secondary workers are more15
likely to be enrolled in formal education if their husbands are immigrants (and credit constrained)
than if their husbands are Australian residents who are less likely to be credit constrained. This is
inconsistent with the family investment hypothesis which suggests that credit constraints lead
secondary workers to not only  work more but also to forgo investment in their own human capital.
When we examine nontraditional families (column 2), we find a pattern which is completely
at odds with the predictions of the family investment hypothesis. Controlling for observable
characteristics, foreign-born men who are secondary workers married to immigrant women are less
likely to participate in the labor market, less likely to be employed and more likely to be students
investing in their own human capital than are foreign-born men who are secondary workers married
to Australian residents. 
Thus, we find mixed evidence on the family investment hypothesis among traditional
families while the evidence for nontraditional families is completely at odds with the family
investment hypothesis. Note that in these comparisons we are comparing immigrant women to
immigrant women and immigrant men to immigrant men so that the comparisons are not confounded
by a gender effect nor are they driven by nativity.
Immigrant Families: Gender and Comparative Advantage
In the previous section we considered only the behavior of secondary workers in immigrant
and mixed families as a means of isolating the effects of credit constraints.  In this section, our focus
is on both principal applicants and secondary workers in immigrant households.  This allows us to
estimate models of behavior that simultaneously allow for the effects of gender and comparative
advantage (as measured by principal applicant/secondary worker status).  Our model controls for the16
effects of being female, a spouse, and in a traditional family (an interaction of the previous two) on
behavior at the first interview as well as in the change in behavior between the first and third
interviews (over the first three and a half years after arrival). As in Table 2 the coefficients reported
in Table 3 are from linear probability models, the standard errors were calculated using White’s
heteroscedasticity consistent variance-covariance estimate and the numbers presented in square
parenthesis are t-statistics. The set of additional controls is the same as in Table 2. 
[Table 3 about here]
Because we are comparing men with women and primary workers with secondary workers
within immigrant families (and not across family types), it is not clear that the family investment
hypothesis makes predictions about the levels of labor market and human capital investment activity.
For example, Table 3 indicates that among immigrant families, shortly after migration, conditional
on gender, secondary workers are considerably less likely than principal applicants to be employed
or participating in the labor market. However, this is not necessarily inconsistent with the family
investment hypothesis, which says that secondary workers work a lot initially to finance
consumption, while principal applicants invest and then see earnings growth. It could be that
principal applicants consistently work more than their partners.  If the family investment hypothesis
holds, however, the gap should increase over time as principal applicants assimilate into the new
labor market and the need for consumption financing by the secondary worker decreases. At the
same time, the gap in school enrollment rates are expected to decrease as principal applicants
complete their human capital investments.  17
Indeed, the bottom panel of Table 3 indicates that the hours, employment and participation
gaps between principal applicants and secondary workers all grew between the first and third
interviews, although none of the changes is statistically significant.  The results in Table 3 also
indicate that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the gender effects--at least in levels-- are very large indeed, and
that there are some significant interaction effects for female spouses.  Taken together, these results
suggest that the behavior of immigrant households is quite complex and while there is weak evidence
to support the family investment hypothesis, there is strong evidence that other factors are also at
work.
IV. Discussion
It is appropriate that immigration research move beyond a simple analysis of individuals to
consider entire immigrant households.  After all, immigrants migrate and live in households and,
furthermore, immigration policy typically results in the selection of households rather than
individuals.  Research on the economics of immigration is also moving beyond simply measuring
assimilation to an examination of the factors that affect assimilation and the mechanisms by which
immigrants (and immigrant households) assimilate. Nevertheless, researchers pursuing these
questions face important obstacles. Many of the factors of interest (age of arrival, intermarriage,
region of origin, visa category, gender and comparative advantage) are highly confounded, and
disentangling their effects is exceedingly difficult. 
One way to make progress is to look for cross-national variation in institutions and policies,
and for data which is sufficiently detailed to allow the researcher to exploit such institutional
variation. In this paper, we have exploited a feature of Australian immigration policy (the large18
“points- based” or skill-based” visa category) and detailed new data (the Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Australia) to disentangle the roles of gender and labor market comparative advantage
in the behavior of immigrant households.  
We find that a non-trivial fraction of households migrating to Australia in this skill-based
visa category designate the female partner as the principal applicant. An examination of education
levels and work experience among these households suggests that principal applicant status does
indeed correspond to an economic notion of comparative advantage in the labor market. Thus, in
these data, the effects gender and comparative advantage in immigrant households can be separately
identified. 
The family investment hypothesis posits that credit-constrained immigrant families wishing
to make post-migration human capital investments must finance that investment themselves.  This
results in specialization among immigrant family members with one partner investing in host
country-specific human capital and the other partner undertaking those labor market activities that
facilitate the financing of current consumption.  Specifically, relative to their native-born
counterparts secondary workers in immigrant families are expected to be more likely to work, to
work longer hours, and to forego their own investment in human capital by taking jobs that are
initially better paying but which offer little prospect for advancement. We implemented tests of the
family investment hypothesis on the LSIA data that follow Baker and Benjamin (1997) in comparing
the secondary worker in an immigrant couple to  immigrant secondary workers with an non-
immigrant spouse. We find some support for the family investment hypothesis among traditional
households (where the male partner holds comparative advantage), but not among  nontraditional
households (where the female partner holds comparative advantage in the labor market).19
The support we find among traditional households is perhaps more convincing when the
nature of a our sample is considered. In order to separate gender and comparative advantage we
focus on households qualifying (via the points test) in the skill-based visa class. Among these
households the individual with the greatest number of potential points - and thus labor market
comparative advantage - should be (and appears to be) designated as the principal applicant. Thus
we can separately identify gender and comparative advantage. Note, however, that since these
individuals have enough points to qualify they likely have less need to make human capital
investments after arrival and are also less likely to be credit constrained. Thus, in order to identify
comparative advantage without reference to gender, we may be limiting our analysis to a sample of
immigrants for whom the family investment hypothesis is less relevant. This would bias us towards
failing to find evidence for the family investment hypothesis. We, in fact, do find support (even in
this sample) for the family investment hypothesis among traditional households, but distinctly
different behavior among nontraditional households.
Ultimately, we believe that our results suggest two things. First, that the behavior of
immigrant households as they assimilate into new labor markets is richer than standard version of
the family investment hypothesis implies. Gender roles, and perhaps cultural variation in preferences
for gender roles also appear to play a significant role. Second, our analysis provides an example of
how cross-national variation in institutions and immigration policy can shed light on aspects of
immigrant behavior. This would seem to us to be a promising avenue for future research. 20
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TABLE 1:  Incidence of “Nontraditional” Households
                (Percent of Immigrating Couples with a Female Principal Applicant )
Overall 16.4
Female’s Education












Female Worked in 12 Months Prior to Migration
No
Yes



















Male Worked in 12 Months Prior to Migration
No
Yes






Young Children in Household
No
Yes






Any Children in Household
No
Yes





















TABLE 2:  The Role of Credit Constraints in the Behavior of Foreign-Born, Secondary
Workers by Household Type





Immigrant Effect (versus mixed)
(ie., Credit Constraint Effect)




(Immigrant Woman Married to
Male Australian)
coefficient [t-stat]
Immigrant Effect (versus mixed)
(ie, Credit Constraint Effect)












 0.012 [  0.47]
 0.068 [  2.30]











 0.068 [ 1.95]





 0.034 [ 1.13]
(367)
Notes:
1. Linear probability models
2. Other regressors include: the inverse hyperbolic sine (ihs) of the number of adults and of the
number of children in the household, a dummy for the presence of children aged 0-5, months
since migration, state of residence dummies, region of origin dummies, education dummies,
and a quadratic in age for both head and spouse.  The ihs is an alternative transformation
which, unlike the logarithm,  handles zeros (see Burbidge et al., 1988.) Full regression results
available from the authors. 
3. t-statistics in square parenthesis. White’s heteroscedasticity consistent variance-covariance
estimate used throughout.
4.  Individuals who are not employed, but indicate that their principal activity in the reference
period is education are coded as students.24
TABLE 3:  The Role of Comparative Labor Market Advantage Within Immigrant





First Interview Cross Section
All First Interview Respondents







 0.006 [ 0.43]
-8.526 [-8.82] 
  -0.224    [-9.69]
  -0.231  [-11.97]

















  -0.230 [  -9.00]
  -0.260 [-11.09]
  -0.039 [  -2.36]
-11.815 [-10.99]
-0.026   [-0.79]
-0.086   [-2.62]
-0.000   [-0.00]
-0.628   [-0.47]
Change, First Interview to Third Interview
Balanced Panel





 0.033   [0.97]
 0.048   [1.60]
 0.063   [2.14]
 1.615   [1.22]
  0.003  [-0.07]
  0.007   [0.23]
  0.041   [1.38]
 -1.613 [-0.19]
-0.046  [-1.19]




1. Linear probability models.
2. White’s heteroscedasticity consistent variance-covariance estimate used throughout and .
allowance is made for within household (across principal applicant and spouse and across
interviews) correlations. t-statistics in parentheses. 
3. Other regressors include: the inverse hyperbolic sine (ihs) of the number of adults and of
the number of children in the household, a dummy for the presence of children aged 0-5,
months since migration, state of residence dummies, region of origin dummies, education
dummies, and a quadratic in age for both head and spouse.  The ihs is an alternative
transformation which, unlike the logarithm,  handles zeros (see Burbidge et al., 1988.) Full
regression results available from the authors.
4.  “Enrolled” indicates individuals who report that they are enrolled in formal education.CILN Working Papers  (downloadable)
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